Resumen
En la revisión sistemática se analizó la relación entre extorsión, gobernanza criminal y deterioro de la gobernabilidad local en América Latina. Mediante PRISMA 2020 se seleccionaron 16 estudios y se realizó una síntesis temática basada en cuatro clústeres: vulnerabilidad socioeconómica, regulación territorial y mercados criminales, órdenes híbridos y justicia paralela, y captura institucional. Los hallazgos muestran que la extorsión trasciende la extracción económica y funciona como mecanismo de control territorial, regulación social y debilitamiento institucional. La evidencia indica coexistencia entre estructuras estatales y criminales, con efectos sobre legitimidad, capacidad fiscal, confianza ciudadana y autonomía, especialmente en contextos de informalidad y fragilidad institucional.
Citas
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[2] A. E. Feldmann and J. P. Luna, “Criminal governance and the crisis of contemporary Latin American states,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 48, pp. 441–461, 2022, doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-030420-124931.
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[4] B. Magaloni, G. Robles, A. M. Matanock, A. Diaz-Cayeros, and V. Romero, “Living in fear: The dynamics of extortion in Mexico’s drug war,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 53, no. 7, pp. 1124–1174, 2020, doi: 10.1177/0010414019879958.
[5] J. J. Bedoya, J.-E. Ríos, and A. Arredondo, “La coerción extorsiva en Medellín, Colombia,” URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, no. 29, pp. 96–107, 2021, doi: 10.17141/urvio.29.2021.4413.
[6] J. H. Espinoza Escobar, S. Sotelo-Llancari, and V. I. La Rosa Salvador, “Criminal governance and extortion in informal economies: Fear as a mechanism of territorial control in Lima,” Frontiers in Sociology, vol. 11, Art. no. 1795425, 2026, doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2026.1795425.
[7] I. Yupari-Azabache, L. Villena Zapata, H. Rabanal León, and M. Zurita Melendrez, “Factores asociados a la comisión del delito de extorsión en el Distrito Fiscal de La Libertad 2017–2018,” Revista Criminalidad, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 145–163, 2020, doi: 10.47741/17943108.153.
[8] K. Hoelscher and C. G. Garcia, “SMEs, violence and crisis: Stylized facts from a survey in Latin America,” World Development, vol. 184, Art. no. 106720, 2024, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106720.
[9] D. E. Davis and T. Hilgers, “The pandemic and organized crime in urban Latin America: New sovereignty arrangements or business as usual?,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 241–256, 2022, doi: 10.31389/jied.134.
[10] M. A. Ferreira and A. B. Gonçalves, “Criminal governance and systems of parallel justice: Practice and implications in Brazilian urban peripheries,” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, vol. 68, Art. no. 100519, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2021.100519.
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[13] J. E. Rojas-Mora, Á. C. Pinto-Quijano, I. L. Vásquez-Merchán, and C. F. Morales-Sánchez, “Medición y evaluación de gobernanzas criminales y su relación con el narcotráfico en Colombia,” Revista Científica General José María Córdova, vol. 21, no. 44, pp. 817–840, 2023, doi: 10.21830/19006586.1176.
[14] J. S. Herrera and C. B. Martinez-Alvarez, “Diversifying violence: Mining, export-agriculture, and criminal governance in Mexico,” World Development, vol. 151, Art. no. 105769, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105769.
[15] C. Blattman, G. Duncan, B. Lessing, and S. Tobón, “Gang rule: Understanding and countering criminal governance,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 1497–1531, 2025, doi: 10.1093/restud/rdae079.
[16] R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, “Governing the underworld: How organized crime governs other criminals in Colombian cities,” Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 28, pp. 359–385, 2025, doi: 10.1007/s12117-023-09507-z.
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[18] Q. N. Hong et al., Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT), Version 2018: User Guide. Montreal, QC, Canada: McGill University, 2018.
[19] J. E. Moreno Mena, “El delito de extorsión como forma de vulneración de la paz territorial en el municipio de Quibdó: periodo 2018–2022,” Revista Jurídica Derecho, vol. 12, no. 19, pp. 97–116, 2023.
[20] B. Magaloni, E. Franco-Vivanco, and V. Melo, “Killing in the slums: Social order, criminal governance, and police violence in Rio de Janeiro,” American Political Science Review, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 552–572, 2020, doi: 10.1017/S0003055419000856.
[2] A. E. Feldmann and J. P. Luna, “Criminal governance and the crisis of contemporary Latin American states,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 48, pp. 441–461, 2022, doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-030420-124931.
[3] A. Uribe, B. Lessing, N. Schouela, and E. Stecher, “Criminal governance in Latin America: Prevalence and correlates,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 124–142, 2026, doi: 10.1017/S1537592725101849.
[4] B. Magaloni, G. Robles, A. M. Matanock, A. Diaz-Cayeros, and V. Romero, “Living in fear: The dynamics of extortion in Mexico’s drug war,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 53, no. 7, pp. 1124–1174, 2020, doi: 10.1177/0010414019879958.
[5] J. J. Bedoya, J.-E. Ríos, and A. Arredondo, “La coerción extorsiva en Medellín, Colombia,” URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, no. 29, pp. 96–107, 2021, doi: 10.17141/urvio.29.2021.4413.
[6] J. H. Espinoza Escobar, S. Sotelo-Llancari, and V. I. La Rosa Salvador, “Criminal governance and extortion in informal economies: Fear as a mechanism of territorial control in Lima,” Frontiers in Sociology, vol. 11, Art. no. 1795425, 2026, doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2026.1795425.
[7] I. Yupari-Azabache, L. Villena Zapata, H. Rabanal León, and M. Zurita Melendrez, “Factores asociados a la comisión del delito de extorsión en el Distrito Fiscal de La Libertad 2017–2018,” Revista Criminalidad, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 145–163, 2020, doi: 10.47741/17943108.153.
[8] K. Hoelscher and C. G. Garcia, “SMEs, violence and crisis: Stylized facts from a survey in Latin America,” World Development, vol. 184, Art. no. 106720, 2024, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106720.
[9] D. E. Davis and T. Hilgers, “The pandemic and organized crime in urban Latin America: New sovereignty arrangements or business as usual?,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 241–256, 2022, doi: 10.31389/jied.134.
[10] M. A. Ferreira and A. B. Gonçalves, “Criminal governance and systems of parallel justice: Practice and implications in Brazilian urban peripheries,” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, vol. 68, Art. no. 100519, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2021.100519.
[11] J. Duque Daza, “Gobernanza criminal. Cogobiernos entre políticos y paramilitares en Colombia,” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, vol. 66, no. 241, pp. 347–380, 2021, doi: 10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.241.75094.
[12] C. Nieto-Matiz, “When the state becomes complicit: Mayors, criminal actors, and the deliberate weakening of the local state in Colombia,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 1295–1327, 2023, doi: 10.1177/00104140221139380.
[13] J. E. Rojas-Mora, Á. C. Pinto-Quijano, I. L. Vásquez-Merchán, and C. F. Morales-Sánchez, “Medición y evaluación de gobernanzas criminales y su relación con el narcotráfico en Colombia,” Revista Científica General José María Córdova, vol. 21, no. 44, pp. 817–840, 2023, doi: 10.21830/19006586.1176.
[14] J. S. Herrera and C. B. Martinez-Alvarez, “Diversifying violence: Mining, export-agriculture, and criminal governance in Mexico,” World Development, vol. 151, Art. no. 105769, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105769.
[15] C. Blattman, G. Duncan, B. Lessing, and S. Tobón, “Gang rule: Understanding and countering criminal governance,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 1497–1531, 2025, doi: 10.1093/restud/rdae079.
[16] R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, “Governing the underworld: How organized crime governs other criminals in Colombian cities,” Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 28, pp. 359–385, 2025, doi: 10.1007/s12117-023-09507-z.
[17] M. J. Page et al., “The PRISMA 2020 statement: An updated guideline for reporting systematic reviews,” BMJ, vol. 372, Art. no. n71, 2021, doi: 10.1136/bmj.n71.
[18] Q. N. Hong et al., Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT), Version 2018: User Guide. Montreal, QC, Canada: McGill University, 2018.
[19] J. E. Moreno Mena, “El delito de extorsión como forma de vulneración de la paz territorial en el municipio de Quibdó: periodo 2018–2022,” Revista Jurídica Derecho, vol. 12, no. 19, pp. 97–116, 2023.
[20] B. Magaloni, E. Franco-Vivanco, and V. Melo, “Killing in the slums: Social order, criminal governance, and police violence in Rio de Janeiro,” American Political Science Review, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 552–572, 2020, doi: 10.1017/S0003055419000856.
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