Abstract
This systematic review examined the relationship between extortion, criminal governance, and the deterioration of local governance in Latin America. Following the PRISMA 2020 guidelines, 16 studies were selected and synthesized thematically into four clusters: socioeconomic vulnerability, territorial regulation and criminal markets, hybrid orders and parallel justice, and institutional capture. The findings show that extortion extends beyond economic extraction and operates as a mechanism of territorial control, social regulation, and institutional weakening. The evidence indicates the coexistence of state and criminal structures, with consequences for institutional legitimacy, fiscal capacity, public trust, and local autonomy, particularly in contexts characterized by informality and institutional fragility.
References
[1] B. Lessing, “Conceptualizing criminal governance,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 854–873, 2021, doi: 10.1017/S1537592720001243.
[2] A. E. Feldmann and J. P. Luna, “Criminal governance and the crisis of contemporary Latin American states,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 48, pp. 441–461, 2022, doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-030420-124931.
[3] A. Uribe, B. Lessing, N. Schouela, and E. Stecher, “Criminal governance in Latin America: Prevalence and correlates,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 124–142, 2026, doi: 10.1017/S1537592725101849.
[4] B. Magaloni, G. Robles, A. M. Matanock, A. Diaz-Cayeros, and V. Romero, “Living in fear: The dynamics of extortion in Mexico’s drug war,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 53, no. 7, pp. 1124–1174, 2020, doi: 10.1177/0010414019879958.
[5] J. J. Bedoya, J.-E. Ríos, and A. Arredondo, “La coerción extorsiva en Medellín, Colombia,” URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, no. 29, pp. 96–107, 2021, doi: 10.17141/urvio.29.2021.4413.
[6] J. H. Espinoza Escobar, S. Sotelo-Llancari, and V. I. La Rosa Salvador, “Criminal governance and extortion in informal economies: Fear as a mechanism of territorial control in Lima,” Frontiers in Sociology, vol. 11, Art. no. 1795425, 2026, doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2026.1795425.
[7] I. Yupari-Azabache, L. Villena Zapata, H. Rabanal León, and M. Zurita Melendrez, “Factores asociados a la comisión del delito de extorsión en el Distrito Fiscal de La Libertad 2017–2018,” Revista Criminalidad, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 145–163, 2020, doi: 10.47741/17943108.153.
[8] K. Hoelscher and C. G. Garcia, “SMEs, violence and crisis: Stylized facts from a survey in Latin America,” World Development, vol. 184, Art. no. 106720, 2024, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106720.
[9] D. E. Davis and T. Hilgers, “The pandemic and organized crime in urban Latin America: New sovereignty arrangements or business as usual?,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 241–256, 2022, doi: 10.31389/jied.134.
[10] M. A. Ferreira and A. B. Gonçalves, “Criminal governance and systems of parallel justice: Practice and implications in Brazilian urban peripheries,” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, vol. 68, Art. no. 100519, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2021.100519.
[11] J. Duque Daza, “Gobernanza criminal. Cogobiernos entre políticos y paramilitares en Colombia,” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, vol. 66, no. 241, pp. 347–380, 2021, doi: 10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.241.75094.
[12] C. Nieto-Matiz, “When the state becomes complicit: Mayors, criminal actors, and the deliberate weakening of the local state in Colombia,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 1295–1327, 2023, doi: 10.1177/00104140221139380.
[13] J. E. Rojas-Mora, Á. C. Pinto-Quijano, I. L. Vásquez-Merchán, and C. F. Morales-Sánchez, “Medición y evaluación de gobernanzas criminales y su relación con el narcotráfico en Colombia,” Revista Científica General José María Córdova, vol. 21, no. 44, pp. 817–840, 2023, doi: 10.21830/19006586.1176.
[14] J. S. Herrera and C. B. Martinez-Alvarez, “Diversifying violence: Mining, export-agriculture, and criminal governance in Mexico,” World Development, vol. 151, Art. no. 105769, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105769.
[15] C. Blattman, G. Duncan, B. Lessing, and S. Tobón, “Gang rule: Understanding and countering criminal governance,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 1497–1531, 2025, doi: 10.1093/restud/rdae079.
[16] R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, “Governing the underworld: How organized crime governs other criminals in Colombian cities,” Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 28, pp. 359–385, 2025, doi: 10.1007/s12117-023-09507-z.
[17] M. J. Page et al., “The PRISMA 2020 statement: An updated guideline for reporting systematic reviews,” BMJ, vol. 372, Art. no. n71, 2021, doi: 10.1136/bmj.n71.
[18] Q. N. Hong et al., Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT), Version 2018: User Guide. Montreal, QC, Canada: McGill University, 2018.
[19] J. E. Moreno Mena, “El delito de extorsión como forma de vulneración de la paz territorial en el municipio de Quibdó: periodo 2018–2022,” Revista Jurídica Derecho, vol. 12, no. 19, pp. 97–116, 2023.
[20] B. Magaloni, E. Franco-Vivanco, and V. Melo, “Killing in the slums: Social order, criminal governance, and police violence in Rio de Janeiro,” American Political Science Review, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 552–572, 2020, doi: 10.1017/S0003055419000856.
[2] A. E. Feldmann and J. P. Luna, “Criminal governance and the crisis of contemporary Latin American states,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 48, pp. 441–461, 2022, doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-030420-124931.
[3] A. Uribe, B. Lessing, N. Schouela, and E. Stecher, “Criminal governance in Latin America: Prevalence and correlates,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 124–142, 2026, doi: 10.1017/S1537592725101849.
[4] B. Magaloni, G. Robles, A. M. Matanock, A. Diaz-Cayeros, and V. Romero, “Living in fear: The dynamics of extortion in Mexico’s drug war,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 53, no. 7, pp. 1124–1174, 2020, doi: 10.1177/0010414019879958.
[5] J. J. Bedoya, J.-E. Ríos, and A. Arredondo, “La coerción extorsiva en Medellín, Colombia,” URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, no. 29, pp. 96–107, 2021, doi: 10.17141/urvio.29.2021.4413.
[6] J. H. Espinoza Escobar, S. Sotelo-Llancari, and V. I. La Rosa Salvador, “Criminal governance and extortion in informal economies: Fear as a mechanism of territorial control in Lima,” Frontiers in Sociology, vol. 11, Art. no. 1795425, 2026, doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2026.1795425.
[7] I. Yupari-Azabache, L. Villena Zapata, H. Rabanal León, and M. Zurita Melendrez, “Factores asociados a la comisión del delito de extorsión en el Distrito Fiscal de La Libertad 2017–2018,” Revista Criminalidad, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 145–163, 2020, doi: 10.47741/17943108.153.
[8] K. Hoelscher and C. G. Garcia, “SMEs, violence and crisis: Stylized facts from a survey in Latin America,” World Development, vol. 184, Art. no. 106720, 2024, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106720.
[9] D. E. Davis and T. Hilgers, “The pandemic and organized crime in urban Latin America: New sovereignty arrangements or business as usual?,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 241–256, 2022, doi: 10.31389/jied.134.
[10] M. A. Ferreira and A. B. Gonçalves, “Criminal governance and systems of parallel justice: Practice and implications in Brazilian urban peripheries,” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, vol. 68, Art. no. 100519, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2021.100519.
[11] J. Duque Daza, “Gobernanza criminal. Cogobiernos entre políticos y paramilitares en Colombia,” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, vol. 66, no. 241, pp. 347–380, 2021, doi: 10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2020.241.75094.
[12] C. Nieto-Matiz, “When the state becomes complicit: Mayors, criminal actors, and the deliberate weakening of the local state in Colombia,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 1295–1327, 2023, doi: 10.1177/00104140221139380.
[13] J. E. Rojas-Mora, Á. C. Pinto-Quijano, I. L. Vásquez-Merchán, and C. F. Morales-Sánchez, “Medición y evaluación de gobernanzas criminales y su relación con el narcotráfico en Colombia,” Revista Científica General José María Córdova, vol. 21, no. 44, pp. 817–840, 2023, doi: 10.21830/19006586.1176.
[14] J. S. Herrera and C. B. Martinez-Alvarez, “Diversifying violence: Mining, export-agriculture, and criminal governance in Mexico,” World Development, vol. 151, Art. no. 105769, 2022, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105769.
[15] C. Blattman, G. Duncan, B. Lessing, and S. Tobón, “Gang rule: Understanding and countering criminal governance,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 1497–1531, 2025, doi: 10.1093/restud/rdae079.
[16] R. Badillo-Sarmiento and L. F. Trejos-Rosero, “Governing the underworld: How organized crime governs other criminals in Colombian cities,” Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 28, pp. 359–385, 2025, doi: 10.1007/s12117-023-09507-z.
[17] M. J. Page et al., “The PRISMA 2020 statement: An updated guideline for reporting systematic reviews,” BMJ, vol. 372, Art. no. n71, 2021, doi: 10.1136/bmj.n71.
[18] Q. N. Hong et al., Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT), Version 2018: User Guide. Montreal, QC, Canada: McGill University, 2018.
[19] J. E. Moreno Mena, “El delito de extorsión como forma de vulneración de la paz territorial en el municipio de Quibdó: periodo 2018–2022,” Revista Jurídica Derecho, vol. 12, no. 19, pp. 97–116, 2023.
[20] B. Magaloni, E. Franco-Vivanco, and V. Melo, “Killing in the slums: Social order, criminal governance, and police violence in Rio de Janeiro,” American Political Science Review, vol. 114, no. 2, pp. 552–572, 2020, doi: 10.1017/S0003055419000856.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.